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Article 7

PROFESSIONALISM, MENTAL DISABILITY,
AND THE DEATH PENALTY
INTRODUCTION
ILENE ZWIRN, M.D.*
There are several questions that inevitably arise and persist when
legislation for capital punishment is considered philosophically. The most
basic and pervasive of these is whether it is morally acceptable as
punishment. Once legislated, questions surrounding its administration are
certain to arise. If it is acceptable punishment for certain crimes, in which
situations is it specifically unacceptable: To whom and for what reasons
should the death penalty not apply?
When a defendant in a capital case has a mental illness, several specific
questions become relevant during adjudication: Did symptoms of a mental
illness interfere with responsibility for the crime? (Does the insanity
defense apply?) Did mental illness serve to mitigate responsibility (and,
therefore, punishment) for a capital crime? Does mental illness interfere
with competency to be executed for a capital crime? States ask and
answer these questions using varying criteria that depend upon statute and
case law. However, when the issue of mental illness is raised, psychiatric
expertise is usually sought. 1 Because the death penalty in and of itself is
controversial, psychiatrist participation in the proceedings is complicated.
New York prepared for the reintroduction of capital punishment in
early 1995,2 coinciding with the early planning phase of the annual
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University, College of
Physicians and Surgeons; Partner, New York Forensic Psychiatric Associates, LLP. The
author wishes to thank Professor Michael Perlin for his encouragement and guidance.
1. The idea that psychiatric expertise is usually sought in cases of suspected mental
illness is raised in the three articles following this introduction.
2. New York's mandatory death sentence was declared unconstitutional almost
twenty years ago. See People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977). From then, until
the current statute was enacted, the death sentence was not authorized in New York. On
September 1, 1995, New York redefined first degree murder and reinstated the death
sentence as possible punishment for that crime. See Executive Memoranda of Mar. 7,
1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2283 (memorandum from Governor George E. Pataki
approving death penalty laws). New York's first degree murder statute is codified at
section 125.27 of the penal law, and the procedure for determining sentence upon
conviction of first degree murder is set forth in section 400.27 of New York's criminal
procedure law. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996); N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996). Currently, under section 400.27
of the criminal procedure law, the available sentences for first degree murder are life
imprisonment without parole and death. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 400.27. See
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meeting of the Tri-State Chapter of the American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law. This is typically an educational meeting that provides an
opportunity for discussion of important issues facing forensic psychiatrists.
The January 1996 meeting, entitled Psychiatry and the Death Penalty:
Dilemmas, was co-sponsored by the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic of the First
Judicial Department and took place at the Mount Sinai Medical Center in
New York City. The three articles following this introduction are
adaptations of papers presented at the meeting.
In introducing these articles, I will first provide a brief overview of
each. One notable underlying issue is each author's criticism of
colleagues for either substandard participation in the due process
application of the death penalty, for lack of participation therein, or for
their very decision to participate. In addition to criticism, each author
either explicitly or implicitly suggests a remedy. I suggest that the origins
of the criticisms are the authors' emotional responses to the death penalty.
I will discuss the issue of objectivity in psychiatric legal evaluations of
competency to be executed and analogize this to scholarship about the
death penalty.
In "The Executioner's Face is Always Well-Hidden ": The Role of
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies,3 Professor Michael
Perlin discusses the two variables that most significantly affect the
outcome of potential death penalty cases: the (in)adequacy of counsel and
the (mis)use of mental disability evidence. In his examination of the
evolution of mental disability evidence in the courts with respect to death
penalty proceedings, Professor Perlin comments on the courts' emotional
response to cases raising mental disability as an issue. The potential
paradox of the introduction of mitigating evidence is highlighted and
supports the premise that bias against mentally disabled defendants
permeates the legal process and drives decision-making.
In The Psychiatrist as Evaluator: Conflicts and Conscience,4 Dr.
Robert Phillips addresses the dilemma psychiatrists face when considering
participation in capital cases where mental illness is an issue. He states
that there is no ethical prohibition from participation at any phase. While
Dr. Phillips underscores the heavy reliance on psychiatric testimony in
guaranteeing due process in competency to be executed hearings, he
generally Michael Lurner & Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in New York: An
HistoricalPerspective, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 81, 81 (1995).
3. Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner'sFace Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role
of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. RV.201

(1996).

4. Robert T.M. Phillips, M.D., The Psychiatrist As Evaluator: Conflicts and
189 (1996).
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suggests that because fact-finders determine the ultimate question the
evaluator's role in the outcome is less powerful.
Drs. Abraham Halpern and Alfred Freedman trace the history (since
1980) of the positions held by organized medicine and psychiatry
regarding physician participation in death penalty proceedings in The
Erosion of Ethics and Morality in Medicine: Physician Participationin
Legal Executions in the United States.' They state objections to the
American Medical Association's 1995 Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs (CEJA) report6 because of a departure from previous prohibitions
against physician participation. 7 Although the coauthors state clearly their
objections to physician participation in evaluations of competency to be
executed and to the restoration of competency (treatment), they do not
directly address their opinions about physician participation in earlier
(presentencing) phases of the proceedings.
While these articles approach the interface between psychiatric issues
and the death penalty from different perspectives, each author is similarly
critical of one or more aspect of the system to which he has been
professionally devoted. Drs. Halpern and Freedman deconstruct the
evolution of organized medicine's position and highlight contradictions and
shortsightedness in policy-making.
Dr. Phillips criticizes those
psychiatrists who would abstain from participation as if they would
disregard the needs of mentally ill defendants. Professor Perlin reflects
on the court's seemingly random decision-making, the inadequacy of
assigned counsel, and the irrational responses of juries.
Although there are many possible reasons for criticizing one's
colleagues, it seems likely that these criticisms are emotionally generated.
One's reaction to the death penalty may inspire anger either because of a
belief that it is administered unfairly or that it is morally wrong. What
more productive way to express this than by bringing to the foreground
faulty components of a flawed system while suggesting appropriate
responses?
5. Alfred M. Freedman, M.D., & Abraham L. Halpern, M.D., The Erosion of
Ethics and Morality in Medicine: Physician Participationin Legal Executions in the
United States, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 169 (1996).
6. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Physician
Participationin CapitalPunishment:Evaluationof PrisonerCompetence to Be Executed;

Treatment to Restore Competence to Be Executed, CEJA Report 6-A-95 (1995) (on file
with the New York Law School Law Review).
7. See id.; Council Report: Physician Participationin Capital Punishment, 270
JAMA 365 (1993) (referring to the American Medical Association's 1980 Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) report, which prohibited physician participation in

capital punishment).
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In Dr. Phillips's article, his response is that physicians should
participate, when needed, in capital cases. He suggests that psychiatrists
must participate for fear of impeding due process. He assumes that the
assistance of mental health experts will help fact-finders to better
understand mental disability evidence. Drs. Halpern and Freedman
implore individual physicians to abstain and urge organized medicine to
return to earlier ethical standards when morality was uneroded.
Professor Perlin warns emphatically that the help of mental health
experts in court may not be sufficient to overcome the deep systemic bias
that is "sanism." s Educating others as to the use of the principles of
"therapeutic jurisprudence" (with the possibility of systemic change) is his
response to a flawed system. 9
I have suggested that these articles betray emotion. It seems
important, therefore, to examine what we know about individual
expression in other work involving the death penalty. In order to
extrapolate from what has been studied about the performance of
competency for execution evaluations to observations about scholarly work
on the death penalty, I note the following facts. Both result in a
professional work product that taps into thoughts about the death penalty
and neither one requires emotional expression or statement of opinion.
Mary Ann Deitchman et al. found that individual attitudes "affect
forensic examiners' decisions to participate in competency for execution
evaluations."10 They found that "forensic examiners who oppose capital
punishment are unlikely to participate in these evaluations.""
They
further suggested that self-selection factors operate and refer to previously
stated concerns that examiner characteristics may bias outcome in
competency for execution evaluations.'I
8. See Perlin, supranote 3, at 225 (stating that "'sanism' is an irrational prejudice
of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that causes, and is
reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic
bigotry").
9. See id. at 234 (stating that "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence studies the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers'

roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning
whether such rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance
their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles"); see also
Michael L. Perlin, What Is TherapeuticJurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
623 (1993).
10. Mary Ann Deitchman et al., Self-Selection Factorsin the ParticipationofMental
Health Professionalsin CompetencyforExecution Evaluations, 15 LAw &HUM. BEHAV.
287, 299 (1991).

11. Id.
12. See id.
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One question posed to forensic examiners in Deitchman's study
addressed ethical considerations related to participation in evaluations of
competency. The responses showed a significant difference between those
examiners willing to participate and those examiners unwilling to
participate in the evaluations.
Using a scale ranging from one
(participation is in no way a violation of professional ethics) to seven
(participation is a complete violation of professional ethics), the group
means were significantly different: those unwilling to participate had a
mean score of 4.2 and those willing to participate had a mean score of
1.8. Quite remarkable, however, was the reported modal responses for
the two groups: one was the most common answer for those willing and
seven for those unwilling, suggesting that examiners have strong beliefs
regarding the ethics of their participation in these evaluations. 4
In Professor Richard Bonnie's 1990 article, Dilemmas in
Administering the Death Penalty, 5 cited by Drs. Halpern, Freedman, and
Phillips, he suggests that participation is ethically permissible. 6 He
states, however, that "[a] mental health professional who believes that
clinical objectivity is not possible in this context should undoubtedly
decline, on ethical grounds, to conduct these evaluations." 7 The ability
of mental health professionals to be objective has been questioned
previously 8 and Deitchman's study supports these doubts.
Professor Bonnie also comments on "the emotional burden that is
carried by those who administer the process." 9 I wonder whether an
emotional burden such as this could be suppressed for the sake of
objectivity. Are judges, lawyers, or evaluators able to transcend strong
feelings when it is the nature of the work itself that stimulates such
feelings?
One may also consider whether scholars are able to transcend emotion
for the sake of objectivity. The emotions evoked when one considers
participation in adjudication that may lead to execution are likely
percolating when one writes about the issue. It is possible that self-

13. See id. at 298.

14. See id.
15. Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty:Conscientious
Abstention, ProfessionalEthics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 67 (1990).

16. See id. at 76.
17. Id. at 77.
18. See, e.g., Stanley L. Brodsky, ProfessionalEthics and ProfessionalMorality in
the Assessment of Competence for Execution: A Response to Bonnie, 14 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 91, 91-92 (1990).

19. Bonnie, supra note 15, at 90.
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selection is at play for those who are engaged in scholarship about the
death penalty. Are those with the strongest opinions about the death
penalty those most likely to write about it? While this question is clearly
less monumental in terms of the effect on those individuals facing death,
it is relevant in that it serves as a backdrop to the words that follow.

